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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
TRUSTS AND ESTATE PLANNING
Gerald LeVan*
CORPORATE RETIREMENT BENEFITS
In T. L. James & Co. v. Montgomery,1 the Louisiana Su-
preme Court will determine the rights of community spouses
and forced heirs in retirement plan death benefits. Montgom-
ery was married twice, one son being born of each marriage.
His first marriage ended in divorce; a legal separation from
his second wife was pending at his death. Montgomery com-
menced work for T. L. James during the first marriage and
remained so employed until his death. During that time he
earned vested interests in the company pension plan and
profit sharing plan, accruing death benefits worth some
$64,800.2 A week before his second wife filed for separation, he
secretly entrusted $11,000 in community cash to his older son
and named him as sole beneficiary of both retirement plans
plus $22,500 of company group life insurance. His widow, al-
leging that these acts were in fraud of her rights as surviving
spouse in community, claimed a half-interest in the retire-
ment plan death benefits. The younger son claimed one-
fourth of the plan death benefits and one-fourth of the group
insurance proceeds as forced heir.3
The older son relied upon courts of appeal decisions
analogizing plan death benefits to life insurance, 4 arguing
that since forced heirs and community spouses have no rights
to life insurance proceeds they have no comparable rights in
these closely analogous death benefits. The spouse relied on a
series of intermediate appellate cases involving divorce, all of
which recognize, to some extent, the right of a non-employee
spouse in potential retirement benefits that accrued during
the existence of the community.5 The younger son argued
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 308 So. 2d 481 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. granted, 310 So. 2d 850 (La. 1975).
2. Both plans were "qualified" pursuant to INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 401 (f).
The profit sharing plan was noncontributory. The pension plan was a
defined contribution plan (defined benefit). Both plans were fully vested.
3. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1493.
4. Succession of Mendoza, 288 So. 2d 673 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973); Succes-
sion of Rockvoan, 141 So. 2d 438 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
5. Lynch v. Lawrence, 293 So. 2d 598 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
295 So. 2d 809 (La. 1974); Langlinais v. David, 289 So. 2d 343 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1974); Laffitte v. Laffitte, 232 So. 2d 92 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970).
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that recent fourth circuit decisions requiring the payee of
U.S. Government "or" bonds to account to the spouse and to
forced heirs entitled him to his legitime both in the death
benefits and insurance proceeds. 6 The First Circuit Court of
Appeal held the group insurance proceeds payable to the
named beneficiary (older brother) free of the forced heir's
claim 7 and, applying the same reasoning by analogy, rejected
the claims of both the spouse and the younger son to death
plan benefits.
Suppose an employer agrees to pay death, disability and
retirement benefits to his employees but the company cannot
afford the actuarial risk out of operating income. The com-
pany could purchase insurance to cover all or part of the risk.
Premium cost could be defrayed through payroll deductions
or as a form of additional but deferred compensation. Or, to
reduce its cost, the company might bypass insurance in favor
of direct investment in the stock market, in effect becoming
"self-insured."8 The employee would receive the same benefits
whether the company plan is "funded" with life insurance or
with other investments; he is "insured" by his employer's
promise. To this point, the treatment of plan benefits as
though they were insurance proceeds appears quite logical.
A life insurance beneficiary need not be named in a will.9
It suffices that the form complies with the insurer's require-
ments. Applied by analogy to retirement plan benefits, com-
pliance with the formalities required by the plan itself should
suffice-a practical solution. Many large payrolls necessarily
cross state lines, making it inconvenient if not impossible to
design a form which would comply with the testamentary
requirements of every applicable state. Moreover, the prac-
tice in Louisiana as elsewhere is to pay plan benefits accord-
ing to the employer's designation form as though plan ben-
efits were insurance. So long as most employees die intes-
tate, and most who die testate make no mention of retirement
benefits in their wills, requiring testamentary form for ben-
eficiary designation seems impractical.
6. Succession of Guerre, 197 So. 2d 738 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967); Succes-
sion of Videau, 197 So. 2d 655 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
7. The court failed to discuss the precise statutory authority. LA. R.S.
22:647 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1958, No. 125.
8. The term "self-insured" is admittedly illogical but conveys the sense
that one omits insurance in circumstances when others similarly situated
would likely purchase it.
9. Michiels v. Succession of Gladden, 190 La. 917, 183 So. 217 (1938).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Assume that the decedent, an insured employee, is the
husband. Unless the wife or the husband's estate is named
beneficiary, the wife has no community right to the proceeds
of his life insurance. As head and master, he is free to pay the
premiums with community funds and to name a third person
as beneficiary.'0 Although she would be entitled to an ac-
counting for her separate funds used to pay premiums, or for
community funds used to maintain his separate policy," dic-
tum in Succession of Brownlee12 suggests that she is not enti-
tled to an accounting for community funds used to pay pre-
miums on community policies even if the proceeds are pay-
able to another. Nevertheless, she is deemed to have made a
taxable gift of half the proceeds to the extent she receives
less than half the proceeds of all community policies. 13
The decisions and Louisiana R.S. 22:64714 likewise exempt
insurance proceeds from the claims of forced heirs. When his
potential legitime is diverted to premiums on policies insuring
the decedent's life, and the proceeds are payable to third
persons, a forced heir seems to be without a remedy.'3
10. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2404 provides the wife with an action against the
heirs of her husband, in support of her claim in one-half of the property, on
her satisfactorily provingfraud, but the writer knows of no instance in which
this provision has been urged against the husband for mere designation of a
third party as beneficiary of a community-owned life insurance policy.
11. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2408; Succession of Lewis, 192 La. 734, 189 So. 118
(1939); Succession of Verneuille, 120 La. 605, 45 So. 520 (1908). See generally
REV. RUL. 232, 1953-2 CUM. BULL. 268.
12. 44 La. Ann. 917, 11 So. 590 (1892).
13. Kaufman v. United States, 462 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1972). To the same
effect see REV. RUL. 75-240, 1975 - CUM. BULL. Where a qualified retire-
ment plan is community property and the employee-husband dies having
named a third person as beneficiary, the widow is deemed to have made a gift
of one-half the benefits, even though she knew nothing of the plan, had not
joined in the designation of the beneficiary and was powerless under state
law to alter the situation.
14. "The lawful beneficiary . . . of a life insurance policy ... shall be
entitled to the proceeds . . . against the heirs and legatees . . . [of the
insured]." LA. R.S. 22:647 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1958, No. 125. See
also Sizeler v. Sizeler, 170 La. 128, 127 So. 388 (1930).
15. The result seems odd in contrast to the rigid defense of forced heirs
by the Louisiana courts. One can only speculate as to what first motivated the
Louisiana Supreme Court to treat life insurance proceeds as sui generis.
Perhaps the first cases involved only term insurance, or the cash value
element was not adequately identified or understood. Perhaps the court
thought it would encourage the purchase of life insurance by permitting its
free disposition, or at least foster the quick and certain payment of the
proceeds. Or perhaps this new and peculiar asset-worth so little during life
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Life insurance and retirement plan death benefits repre-
sent the principal value most Louisiana decedents transmit at
death. So far the decisions have made no real distinction
between them, treating both as insurance. In deciding
Montgomery, the Louisiana Supreme Court may re-examine
its traditional sui generis approach to life insurance itself.
The term insurance premium buys nothing but "real in-
surance," protection from untimely death. By contrast, cash
value insurance (whole life insurance) includes an excess
premium in the early years of the policy. This excess premium
later becomes the cash value or "savings element," and, to-
gether with a modest interest build-up over the life of the
policy, may represent a significant portion of the proceeds at
death. As the cash value portion increases, the real insurance
portion decreases correspondingly. The proceeds of cash value
insurance are really two funds--"real insurance" plus cash
value. The cash value is really a savings account created out
of part of each premium dollar. Thus, to the extent of cash
value, or more precisely, "interpolated terminal reserve plus
unearned premium," the proceeds are not insurance but ac-
cumulated savings left with the insurer at interest. It is ar-
guable that this savings account, like any other, should be
subject to the claims of community spouses and forced heirs,
while the remaining proceeds representing "real insurance"
should remain exempt. 16 Direct claims against the insurer by
and so much after death-so defied traditional property classifications that
the court felt compelled to create a new category. Recent decisions dealing
with ownership of policy rights during the life of the insured may provide a
clue. In Catalano v. United States, 429 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1969), the court held
that the naming of the wife as owner of a life insurance policy under the
forms provided by the insurance company was sufficient to transfer all "inci-
dents of ownership" to her. In support it cited a series of Louisiana cases
holding that the naming of an irrevocable beneficiary was equivalent to the
transfer of ownership to him. Succession of Desforges, 135 La. 49, 64 So. 978
(1914); Lambert v. Penn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 50 La. Ann. 1027, 24 So. 1627
(1898); Putnam v. New York Life Ins. Co., 42 La. Ann. 739, 7 So. 602 (1890);
Pilcher v. New York Life Ins. Co., 33 La. Ann. 322 (1881). It has been
suggested that in each of these cases the beneficiary had been irrevocably
designated and policy ownership thereby passed to the beneficiary. Nothing
was left to pass to the beneficiary from the insured at the latter's death to
which the rights of forced heirs could attach. (Policies giving the wife the
power to revoke the designation of a beneficiary did not come into common
use until the twentieth century.)
16. The decisions so far have made no distinction between the proceeds of
term insurance and those of cash value insurance, although it was argued
unsuccessfully in Succession of Videau, 197 So. 2d 655 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967),
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spouses and forced heirs might unduly interfere with the
speed and certainty of settlement, but the widow Montgom-
ery pointed to U.S. Savings Bond cases as an alternative,
arguing that payment of the proceeds to the named ben-
eficiary of the retirement plan, subject to an accounting to
the spouse and forced heirs, should be ordered. The court
rejected this approach.
An employee's retirement account usually represents
compensation diverted to a trust fund and held for payment
on death, retirement or disability. Such account is quite
analogous to the cash value of an ordinary life policy, and the
two should probably be treated alike. The only remaining
question is: what treatment? In Montgomery, the traditional
restraints of community property and forced heirship inevi-
tably will collide with contemporary pressures for freedom of
disposition. There is respectable authority on both sides.
In Jochum v. Estate of Favre,17 aggregate payroll deduc-
tions of some $6,400 refunded under the State of Louisiana
retirement plan were omitted from the descriptive list of the
decedent's estate. The parties stipulated that the fund rep-
resented "annuity proceeds." The executrix argued that since
Louisiana R.S. 47:2404(C) excludes both life insurance and
"retirement or pension plans including annuities" from in-
heritance tax, the annuity should be treated like insurance
for all purposes-including exemption from the claims of
forced heirs. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal held that the
refund should have been included on the descriptive list. The
result suggests that upon retirement, death benefits, treated
as life insurance, are transformed into pension benefits, now
to be treated as annuities.18
DONATIONS BY THE TRUSTEE
In 1969, Mrs. Nannie Mae Simpson created an irrevocable
trust naming herself as sole beneficiary and one of her sons
that with respect to the phrase "proceeds and avails" found in LA. R.S. 22:647
(1950), as amended by La. Acts 1958, No. 125, the term "proceeds" refers to
the risk portion of the proceeds while "avails" refers to the cash value
portion.
17. 313 So. 2d 870 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975).
18. The stipulation that the fund represented "annuity proceeds" was
unfortunate, and probably erroneous; although similar in some respects, the
courts and commentators have traditionally drawn sharp distinctions be-
tween life insurance proceeds and annuity proceeds. Succession of Rabouin,
201 La. 227, 9 So. 2d 529 (1942); see 1 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW &
PRACTICE § 83 at 114 (2d ed. 1965).
[Vol. 36
1976] WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1974-1975 451
as trustee. She gave the trustee power to make inter vivos
donations of trust property "to such persons as Trustee
deems advisable, provided that the written consent of settlor
... shall be required to each such donation." Subsequently,
the trustee, joined by the settlor, made various donations
of land and cattle to eight of her twelve children.
Three disappointed children attacked the validity of these
donations, claiming that the trustee could not be given the
power to donate trust property. The Second Circuit Court of
Appeal, in Succession of Simpson,19 concluded that section
2061 of the Louisiana Trust Code 20 is broad enough to permit
the trustee to donate trust property and that the trust in-
strument had adequately created that power. However, the
court noted that with each donation the trustee acted con-
trary to the interests of the sole beneficiary and would thus
breach his duty of loyalty to his mother unless validly re-
leased after disclosing to her all the material facts.21 The
trustee benefited personally from some, but not all of the
donations. He bore the burden of proving adequate disclosure.
The evidence revealed no disclosure other than a reading
aloud of each act of donation to the settlor immediately prior
to affixing her mark. The court found this to be inadequate.
As a result, he breached the duty of loyalty, he lacked the
power to make the donations, and the donations were null.
The court seemed impressed by what it considered the
"manifest unfairness" of the various donations. In one in-
stance Mrs. Simpson had given away her home, then donated
additional trust property in order to recover its use for the
remainder of her life. In addition, the trustee, with her ap-
proval, had sold an option covering nearly all of the remain-
ing trust property at an option price that the court found to
be wholly inadequate and unfair. As to her motives, a letter
in the record reflected that she had excluded some of her
children from the donations "to punish them" for failure to
allow her trustee-son to manage their interests in the family
property.
The court's approach finds only implied support in the
Trust Code but accords with the Restatement Second of
19. 311 So. 2d 67 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 313 So. 2d 839 (La. 1975).
20. "The nature and extent of the duties and powers of a trustee are
determined from the provisions of the trust instrument .... " LA. R.S. 9:2061
(Supp. 1964).
21. See LA. R.S. 9:2063 (Supp. 1964).
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Trusts.22 The court invoked sections 20 6 2,2 208224 and 208325
of the Louisiana Trust Code as well as sections 208526 and
209127 by analogy. In essence, these sections would invalidate
a trust provision purporting to limit a trustee's duty to ad-
minister the trust solely in the interests of the beneficiary,
prohibit him from buying trust property or selling to the
trust, obligate him to preserve and maintain trust property
and, whenever dealing on his own account, to "communicate
all material facts in connection with the transaction that the
trustee knows or should know. '28 The Trust Code does not
seem to go as far as the Restatement in requiring that all
transactions necessitating the beneficiary's consent be "fair
and reasonable" as well. However, the court in Simpson
suggests by implication that had the beneficiary been fully
advised of the unfairness and unreasonableness of these
transactions, she would not have consented.
Simpson does not mandate that a mechanism for the do-
nation of trust property is always improper or unworkable. A
settlor might wish to create an irrevocable trust to manage
his property, realizing that trust property and income might
exceed his needs and should be donated to reduce his ultimate
taxable estate. An analogous provision is found in Louisiana
R.S. 9:1022 for donations on behalf of interdicts by their
curators under certain circumstances when the interdict has
a prior pattern of making such donations. It is only in the
trustee's overreaching that Simpson would cause concern.
DELEGATION OF TRUSTEE'S POWERS
In Holladay v. Fidelity National Bank,2 9 settlor sued to
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 comment (w), § 216 com-
ments (m), (n) (1957).
23. "A provision of the trust instrument that purports to limit a trustee's
duty of loyalty to the beneficiary is ineffective, except to the extent permitted
by this Part." LA. R.S. 9:2062 (Supp. 1964).
24. "A trustee shall administer the trust solely in the interest of the
beneficiary." LA. R.S. 9:2082 (Supp. 1964).
25. "A trustee in dealing with a beneficiary of the trustee's own account
shall deal fairly with him and communicate to him all material facts in
connection with the transaction that the trustee knows or should know." LA.
R.S. 9:2083 (Supp. 1964).
26. LA. R.S. 9:2085 (Supp. 1964) prohibits a sale of trust property to the
trustee unless the trust instrument specifically permits it.
27. "A trustee is under a duty to a beneficiary to take reasonable steps to
take, keep control of, and preserve the trust property." LA. R.S. 9:2091 (Supp.
1964).
28. LA. R.S. 9:2803 (Supp. 1972).
29. 312 So. 2d 883 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975).
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remove the trustees of two trusts which named her as income
beneficiary and her two nephews as principal beneficiaries.
The defendant bank was trustee of one trust. The other trust,
apparently composed of Texas lands, named Fidelity's presi-
dent and one of its trust officers as individual co-trustees.
They retained Fidelity as agent for the Texas trust because
the bank was not authorized to act as trustee under Texas
law. The court said it was "unable to approve" the practice
notwithstanding the fact that Texas had not complained.
Otherwise, the court entirely rejected the settlor's manifold
complaints.
Settlor had complained of self-dealing in that she had
purchased a home individually from one of the individual
co-trustees and subsequently transferred it to the trust. She
also complained that the trustee had delayed in recording the
trust instrument in those parishes where immovable trust
property was situated as required by Louisiana Trust Code
section 2092.30 Lastly, she complained that the trustee's in-
vestment policy of retaining low-yield municipal bonds in the
Louisiana trust for several years after a decline in income
from the Texas trust was a breach of the "prudent man"
principle. 31
In response, the court found no self-dealing; on the con-
trary, the trustees had previously refused her request to
purchase the home out of existing trust assets. With respect
to the delay in recordation, the court seemed satisfied that
the failure to record was consonant with the settlor's desires
to withhold, temporarily, details of the trust from the princi-
pal beneficiaries. Finally, as to the municipal bonds, the court
found:
With regard to the substitution of high yield securities
when the income from the Texas trust declined, we find...
that the test is not that the trustee must always have
his judgment vindicated by the market, but that he exer-
cise such skill and care as a man of ordinary prudence
would exercise in dealing with his own property.
The evidence convinces us that the investment prac-
tices of the trustee, the constant review of the trust
30. "If at any time the trust property . . . includes immovables . . . a
trustee shall file the trust instrument for record in each parish in which the
[trust] property is located." LA. R.S. 9:2092 (Supp. 1964).
31. LA. R.S. 9:2127 (Supp. 1964), as amended by La. Acts 1968, No. 135, § 1.
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portfolio by the directors, are sound and comply with
the above statutory provision.3 2
The court's comment expressing disapproval as to the
arrangement for indirect management of the Texas trust by a
Louisiana bank seems unwarranted. The settlor obviously
desired bank management of the Texas trust and the agency
agreement provided it. So long as each state remains jealous
of its own trust business, such arrangements will likely con-
tinue.33 One might ask how many "Louisiana trusts" are man-
aged indirectly by Texas banks under similar arrangements.
So long as the settlor approves such delegation, there should
be no cause for complaint.
Some practitioners complain that requiring that the trust
instrument be recorded is counterproductive. They argue
that the conveyance of immovable property to a trust may
raise title problems (as a presumed donation) and that the
very confidentiality some settlors desire is violated by recor-
dation.
Faced with discontented beneficiaries or settlors, trustees
are often tempted to resign. Yet those who seek third party
management need assurance that corporate trustees will not
willingly step aside merely because someone is dissatisfied,
even in the face of litigation. Continuing trust administration
in the face of litigious adversity is part of the service.
Most trustees generally remain, even if unwelcome, al-
though section 1788 of the Trust Code 34 permits them to re-
sign at any time. If the settlor wants someone empowered to
substitute trustees, the trust instrument should expressly so
provide. The evidence necessary to prove grounds for removal
of a corporate trustee seldom exists. 35
32. Holladay v. Fidelity National Bank, 312 So. 2d 883, 888 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1975).
33. "A trustee must be a natural person enjoying full capacity to con-
tract who is a citizen of the United States, or a Louisiana bank or trust
company, or a bank or trust company ... domiciled in this state" (emphasis
added). LA. R.S. 9:1783 (Supp. 1964).
34. LA, R.S. 9:1788 (Supp. 1964).
35. See, e.g., Succession of Supple, 274 So. 2d 790 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973);
Harriss v. Concordia Bank & Trust Co., 265 So. 2d 330 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972).
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